Introduction
The notion of an 'intellectual time' or a 'time of the intellect' seems problematic and in some respects self-contradictory within the Aristotelian framework of Renaissance philosophy. How could a notion that is inextricable from matter and physical motion be applied to intellectual acts? From the Middle Ages onwards, a radical view developed: like any other immaterial substance, the intellect must be said to be supra tempus -'above time,' as Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) states in accordance with the Liber de causis.1 Christian theologians, however, typically ascribed a specific duration to the intellectual activity of angels, which characterised it as a discrete succession of thoughts with no relationship whatsoever to the continuous time of natural substances.2 The thirteenth-century philosopher Giles of Rome (1247-1316) made the suggestion that, in some way, the operations of our intellect may be analogous to angelic thought: "From things we see in our mind, he observes, a way is wide open to investigate that angelic time."3 But this analogy did not result in a clear conception of human intellectual time, as Carlos Steel remarks: "The medieval authors never admit that the discrete time is also applicable to the cognitive activities of the human souls. In their view those souls share in their activities the same measure of duration as all the physical events in the sublunary realm."4 If Heavenly intellects are subsumed under aevum or eveternity, the dependency on phantasia, which is typical of human life, connects our intelligence and its successive operations to the bodily motions of the outer world. As a result, the human intellect has an indirect relationship to time -'per accidens' in Aquinas' words -, namely through phantasmata derived from sensible things: angels, however, know a kind of duration that is intrinsic to their intellectual activity. The idea that a faculty can have a nature different to that of its operations -for instance, that the intellect can be atemporal while its operations, because of their link to material objects, are temporal -was challenged by followers of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), in the larger context of the revival of Alexandrist conceptions of the soul in Northern Italy. It is well known that the Pomponazzi affair produced an important shift in psychology and anthropology at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In his De immortalitate animae of 1516, Pomponazzi infers from the human mind's dependency on phantasms that, even in the case of self-reflection, 'intelligere est cum continuo & tempore' . He also contrasts human intellection with the atemporal activity of separated substantial forms.6 Simone Porzio (1496-1554), an enthusiastic reader of Alexander of Aphrodisias and professor of philosophy and medicine in Pisa and Naples, went even further in his De mente humana disputatio of 1551 where he strongly opposed the idea that the intellect might be connected to phantasms without being itself corruptible and mortal.7 Porzio's overall psychology was 'mortalist': he understood Aristotle's entelecheia as meaning "the perfection and final end reached through a motion" and assimilated intellection with "a natural motion, through which a form was moved from one subject to the other." 8 A direct consequence of this naturalistic conception of the soul was to quidem est supra tempus, sed per accidens subiditur tempori: inquantum scilicet intelligit cum continuo et tempore secundum phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles considerat, ut in Primo dictum est. Et ideo judicandum est, secundum hoc, de ejus mutatione secundum conditionem temporalium motuum". See also the princeps thomistarum, John Capreolus (1380-1444), In II sent. (Venice 1589), 106: "Sic intellectiones nostrae, quia sunt termini extrinseci fantasiationum, dependent quodamodo a motu & tempore primi mobilis, & mensurantur tali mensura exteriori." Even when Thomas Aquinas apparently deals with a purely psychical duration in his De Instantibus, he ultimately relies on its relationship to phantasmata. See Jean-Luc Solère, "Descartes et les discussions médiévales sur le temps," undermine the idea that the human intellect was eternal or independent from time. Porzio indeed insists in his Disputatio that human activities are inevitably subject to birth and death, interruption and corruption, including the noblest of them.9 According to him, all the immaterial aspects of thought are to be referred to an immaterial agent, God, while the human intellect, identified with the Aristotelian 'possible intellect,' is both passive and corruptible.10 Whereas Porzio does not give a detailed treatment of the relationship between time, duration and the human mind, other Italian scholars did tackle this issue. They asked whether the human intellect operates within time and to what extent intellection can be regarded as an inherently temporal process. The rejection of the immortality of the soul had suddenly opened a new perspective on Aristotelian accounts of time, since the soul was no longer considered as a separated substance but instead as a form deeply involved in matter and subject to change. Michael Edwards has recently suggested that the reading and interpretation of a somewhat obscure passage of De Anima, namely chapter 6 of book 3, played an important role in early modern debates over intellectual time.11 But this passage seems to have received careful attention as early as the 1550s when, under the influence of Porzio or in reaction to his materialistic psychology, an effort was made to clarify Aristotle's assertions. Among the most significant positions developed were those of Marcantonio Genua (1491-1563), Giulio Castellani (1528-1586), Antonio Montecatini (1537-1599) and Francesco Piccolomini (1520-1604). Genua, Montecatini and Piccolomini were professors of natural philosophy: Genua and Piccolomini at the University of Padua. Montecatini, who was also an important political figure, taught at the University of Ferrara.12 A former student of the universities of Ferrara, Bologna and Padua, Castellani was appointed professor of philosophy at the Sapienza at the end of his career.13 As we shall see, he played a crucial role in the development of the whole debate.
The Aristotelian Concept of 'Indivisible Time'
The Aristotelian definition of time focuses on physical motion: time is conceived in the Physics as the quantifiable aspect of motion with respect to before and after. It is well known that this conception was strongly criticized by Renaissance authors as diverse as Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), Bernardino Telesio (1509-1588), Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) and Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597), but little is known about discussions regarding other aspects of the Aristotelian conception of time, particularly its relationship to the human mind.14 In a famous passage of the fourth book of the Physics, Aristotle not only says that the intellect numbers time, but he also seems to attribute an ontological significance to that operation:
And if nothing can count except consciousness, and consciousness only as intellect (not a sensation merely), it is impossible that time should exist if consciousness did not; unless the 'objective thing' which is subjectively time to us, if we may suppose that movement could thus objectively exists without there being any consciousness (Physics 4.14, 223a 15-28).
Unfortunately, except for those sketchy indications, Aristotle does not say anything about the temporal nature of the intellective operations. His circumspection renders the treatment of intellectual time in De Anima 3.6 all the more significant. The text of this passage is as follows:
Since the term indivisible (adiairéton) has two senses -potential or actual -there is nothing to prevent the mind from thinking of the indivisible when it thinks of length (which is in actuality undivided), and that in indivisible time (en chronô adiairétô intellection is, in the case of the length, 'potentially' divided, which means that a division can occur within it. Such a claim is consistent with the declaration that time and length are 'both divisible and indivisible in the same sense' . A similar difficulty appears in the second paragraph of the text above: Aristotle says that 'the indivisible activity of the soul,' although its object is not a quantity but a quality or a form, is 'incidentally' divisible or divisible 'by accident (kata symbébèkos)' . Why is there still divisibility in the undivided time of thinking? Is there any contradiction in Aristotle's exposition? Most ancient and medieval commentators agreed that the expression 'indivisible time' implied an 'instant' or a 'now' , in accordance with the fourth and sixth books of Physics. Whereas "time must be continuous," that is to say "capable of being divided into parts that can in their turn be divided again, and so on without limit," (6.2, 232b 25-26) Aristotle says that "there is something pertaining to time which is indivisible" (6.3, 234a 23-24) and is not a duration but a 'limit' (4.10, 218a 23-24), namely what he calls a 'now.'19 The late-antique commentator John Philoponus consequently complained that Aristotle's vocabulary in De Anima 3.6 was inadequate:20
By an 'indivisible time' he means a now, speaking ill. For a now is not a time but a beginning of time. By a 'now' I mean an instant. But if you take the now that has duration, that has a beginning and a limit and is a time. But now we are speaking of the instantaneous now.21
The beginning of a time indeed is not a time: it is a limit of an interval of time and an indivisible moment, as Aristotle explains in Physics 6.5 (235b 30-236a 7).22 What makes Philoponus so unsatisfied with the expression 'indivisible time' is that the word 'time' should not be used at all in that context: in the Aristotelian framework time is divisible by essence.23 An instant is something indivisible in time, but it cannot be an indivisible time.
The idea that time and indivisibility are incompatible was further developed by Renaissance Neoplatonists. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples (circa 1450-1537) declared in his Paraphrasis of De Anima:
The intellection and the time of intellection are indivisible, if we may call 'time' the duration of intellection. Indeed, truly speaking, the intellect understands neither in time nor in a moment or indivisible part of time, but either in eveternity or an atom of it.24
This interpretation echoes Marsilio Ficino's commentary on the Enneads 3.7, where he declares that "as the sense acts within time, the intellect acts in eveternity," rehearsing the Platonic correspondence between eternity and the intelligible realm. According to Ficino, 'touch' is a common feature of knowledge, whether sensitive or intellectual; but the intellect is a better 'touch' since "while it touches, it is touched in return," which means that it develops into a separate dimension. The activity of the intellect is indeed supposed to develop outside the continuous time of human life, while reason, which is a different faculty, is viewed as a medium between eternal and sensible things. Ficino claims that rational souls are "in eveternity by their essence, and in time by their action and motion."25 Intellection as such pertains to a supernatural kind of duration, which is similar to the eveternity that qualifies the time of Heavenly beings. It is interesting to note that Giles of Rome had provided a similar interpretation of De anima 3.6: Giles' interpretation was also echoed by Averroist philosophers who wanted to defend the dogma of the immortality of the human soul. Agostino Nifo, for instance, quotes Giles in his Expositio subtilissima in tres libros Aristotelis de anima: "The intellect as intellect neither understands in time nor in an instant of time, since it stands neither in time nor in a instant of time, but it certainly understands in eveternity, as other intelligences do."26 It seems natural that a Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle would insist on the atemporality of the intellect and link it to the soul only insofar as it is affected by sensitive things. But it is highly questionable whether such a reading can resolve the philological and philosophical difficulties raised by De anima 3.6, or whether it can clarify Aristotle's enigmatic claim that the human intellect acts 'in indivisible time.'
The Simplician Trend and Its Criticism in Castellani's De Humano Intellectu (1568)
During the Renaissance, a number of scholars tried hard to solve the difficulties outlined above and give an account of Aristotelian 'indivisible time.' Most of them, despite being Neoplatonists, were influenced by the revival of the ancient commentators (Philoponus, but also Simplicius, Themistius, along with Alexander of Aphrodisias) that took place during the Italian cinquecento and cognatio sensus ad sentienda: cognatio inquam intelligentiae mutua, quatenus enim tangit, tangit atque vicissim: sicut igitur sensus est, agitque in tempore, sic intellectus in aevo. Here, Genua introduces the Platonic distinction between nous and dianoia in order to justify the idea that the intellect can take extended things into view. While the term nous is used for the immediate apprehension of intelligible notions, dianoia usually designates the faculty for dealing with intelligible notions as they are captured by images existing in space and time. Accordingly, since the 'dianoetica intellectio'31 is an act of the intellect that bears on sense data and extended objects, the indivisible time of the intellectual operation is potentially divisible and hence is not an 'instantaneous now' , but rather a certain lapse of time. In other words, the indivisible time needed to grasp something that has extension is in fact continuous time, although it is actually not divided because it comes with one intellectual act. Genua relies on Simplicius, who considers that, compared to contemplating pure and indivisible Forms, apprehending continuous things or the limits of continuous things amounts to "coming down together with them" or "being co-divided with objects."32 While the thinker totally "remains in himself" and reaches the oneness of eternity when apprehending forms, he is bound to decline and operate within time, "although an actually undivided time," when considering quantities.33 Such a time, which is likely to become divided, has nothing in common with the "superior now" of contemplation.34 According to Simplicius, the temporal status of intellection is "co-ordinate" with its content: "eadem est ratio temporis et ratio intellectae" as Giulio Pace declared a few decades later. Although Aristotle said 'in time' , he nevertheless added 'in indivisible' so as to indicate what is above time, 'for all time is divisible' . Thus, as the addition 'of stone' in the expression 'ship made of stone' destroys its being a ship, so also the addition of 'indivisible' to time cancels its being a time.37
If this is the only way to preserve the intellection of forms from falling into time, it seems an almost purely rhetorical strategy! Another solution would be to accept the idea that the intellection of forms also happens in continuous time. But this move would certainly amount to rejecting the neoplatonic conception of time and the human soul.
Giulio Castellani, faithful for the most part to Porzio's psychology, embraced that position in the late 1550s and offered a viable alternative to the Simplician interpretation that gave a new impulse to the debate on the time of the intellect.38 Castellani's interest in the question of intellectual time seems to originate in a quite different context, namely the reading of Nicomachean Ethics 10.3 (1174a 16-19 commentator on the Nicomachean Ethics, Donatus Acciaiolus (1429-1478). Acciaiolus explains that pleasure in Aristotle, far from being the result of a motion, is always produced "in an instant" or "moment of time," that is to say without any process or delay. Like "the vision of light" or "the representation of an image in a mirror" that can be immediately perceived by the beholder, Acciaiolus says, pleasure happens "tota simul": it requires no time to be experienced and whenever it has to be prolonged, like a visual image lasting for several minutes, it will nonetheless be entirely actualised "in every part and at every point" of its duration.40 In Metaphysics 9.6, Aristotle indeed argues that vision does not need time to occur. It is immediately completed: "At the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking and have thought," (1048b 23-24) because the end pursued is entirely achieved in the act itself. Present and perfect tenses, Aristotle argues, are therefore conjoined in that particular circumstance.41 From that analysis of vision and pleasure Castellani coins a distinction that allegedly applies to all the "powers of the soul": a "proper sensible", insofar as it is known as "delectable", will give birth to a "first generation of pleasure" once it is perceived. Then, that first action will be completed by a second action, unfortunately ignored by Acciaiolus, when the "virtus appetendi" is put into motion and develops into an enjoyable movement or activity.42 Castellani distinguishes two modes of pleasure, one linked to the reception (suscipere) of 'species' , the other one to enjoyment (fruor). In the first case, pleasure is a pure sensation; it can affect any animal and does not depend on common sense as Porzio unsuccessfully argues. But Castellani's claim is that human sensation, when taken as a whole and including the second mode of pleasure, inevitably requires awareness as well as duration and cannot be simply said to be instantaneous. It is precisely in order to justify this assertion that he refers to De Anima 3.6 and engages with Aristotle's subtle distinction between an 'instant' and 'indivisible time' , insisting that our intellect, because it is tied to phantasms, is necessarily entangled with temporality.43 Castellani devoted another substantial discussion to this question three years later in a chapter of his De humano intellectu (1561) significantly entitled "On the triple act of the intellect: that our intellection cannot be achieved in an instant, but always requires some time."44 In this chapter he openly maintains the temporal nature of intellectual activity: "Either simply apprehending things, or composing and dividing, namely discoursing, intellection demands a determinate lapse of time, [it being] given that no action of our intellect can be completed within an instant."45 What Castellani calls an "entirely new and amazing opinion" is based, he argues, on textual evidence: "If this undivided time in which (as Aristotle said above) a length is perceived as an instant, how would it be cut into two parts, since an instant can neither actually nor potentially be cut into parts?"46 We are therefore induced to conclude that "indivisible time" always means "a continuous time which is one in act" or, as Castellani also puts it, a "space of time."47 Intellection may therefore be compared to sensation and imagination as far as their generative process is concerned:
Nobody must be amazed that natural generation happens in an instant and that our intelligence, which is some spiritual generation, necessarily 43 Castellani requires some sort of time: since in our intellect and our other faculties of knowledge, leaving aside this first production of images and species that happens in an instant, we have judgment and knowledge of the object, which cannot be completed in a moment of time. This is quite clear in sense and imagination. Imagination, indeed, even if it is instantaneously moved by a phantasm, can hardly get to know it within an instant; it always requires some sort of time. I believe that anyone can experience it in oneself: to my mind, one cannot find anybody who has ever managed to perfectly and plainly perceive something in an instant with his imagination. As you may notice, it is the same in the judgment of the senses.
We cannot see things going fast and speedily through our field of vision, when a projectile has been shot by this noisy and destructive military machine commonly called a cannon. Indeed, we are not given the time that is necessary for the judgment of our eyes to come up.48
Castellani seems to distinguish between two moments within perception: the instantaneous reception of a given and then a judgment giving birth to knowledge and in particular to the identification of the perceived object.49 One can be 'moved' by the 'species' coming from it but one does not have time to see it at all. There is a dual process in our faculties where intellection as a kind of 'objecti cognitio' necessarily comes after 'objecti motio' . What Castellani means is that all cognitive acts are submitted to the same temporality and that instantaneousness is found only in the primitive and confused moment of perception. Castellani's position therefore amounts to immersing the human intellect Antonio Montecatini is one of these thinkers and clearly based his reading of Aristotle's De Anima on Simplicius. He claims with Genua that the Aristotelian "indivisible time" should not be confused with an "instant" or a "moment of time" because it is "true time,"50 that is, "continuous and uninterrupted time."51 However, he openly denies Genua's idea that when Aristotle wrote that extended objects are understood in indivisible time, he was dealing with dianoetic acts.52 Although it takes place in a divisible portion of time, the apprehension of quantities is noetic in nature since it bears on a simple and undivided content. But Montecatini even more clearly opposes Castellani's treatment of the problem. Although he never mentions him in his survey of De Anima 3.6, his move is difficult to appreciate outside of this polemical context. Castellani insists on the discrepancy between sensation and intellection, between 'motion' and 'cognition,' whereas Montecatini's contention is that these operations occur in the same kind of temporality. Even though he seems to come back to the classical thesis that intellection of forms is instantaneous, Montecatini's arguments deserve a careful reading because they show a different understanding of the Aristotelian notions used by Castellani. Montecatini sets out a series of four justifications to support the idea that the intellection of forms occurs in an instant: from Aristotle's own words (argument 1), from experience (argument 2), from the senses (argument 3) and from "the nature of causes of intellection" (argument 4). Arguments 2 and 3 are particularly intriguing. They are explicitly directed against Genua (who, however, does not seem to hold the position Montecatini attributes to him, at least in his survey of De Anima 3.6) and another scholar, Vincenzo Maggi. 53 He reproaches them for "not paying attention to the fact that all forms are understood and grasped by the intellect in a moment of time, even though one can remain as much as one wants and even a long time in the use and contemplation of forms."54 Montecatini claims not only that intellection is instantaneous but also that this instantaneousness corresponds to a true experience or feeling. Argument 3 reinforces that idea: from the superiority of the intellect to the senses, Montecatini infers that if sensation is instantaneous and happens "in an indivisible time" as explained in De Anima 3.2 (426b 29-427a 5),55 then intellection must also be instantaneous and the expression "indivisible time" has the same meaning in both cases. Montecatini's argument is all the more convincing since Aristotle, when describing the process of intellection in De Anima 3.7, explicitly compares science and sensation; he insists that they entail a "motion of a distinct kind" (De Anima 3.7, 431a 6), which is indeed different from motion in physical substances. Montecatini develops this point in argument 4 where he emphasizes the difference between progressive and instantaneous change in Aristotle's Physics.56 He had insisted earlier on the analogy with natural philosophy, stressing the fact that intellectual time depends on the motion of spiritual things as tightly as physical time depends on the motion of bodies.57 Here is the content of argument 4: When commenting on the assertion that "time is also both divisible and indivisible in the same sense as length," Montecatini adds, "Ut vero corporeo in motu IIII & VI Physicarum
The form insofar as it is of that kind [i.e. intelligible] and not continuous is unqualifiedly indivisible; the mind comprehending it is unqualifiedly indivisible too: therefore (following the fifth and sixth books of Physics, in perfect similitude with this bodily motion that happens in a moment, namely generation and corruption, as we declared in our resolution), it is necessary that the form be comprehended and understood by the mind in an unqualifiedly indivisible time as well, which is a moment of time.
That claim can be confirmed from an a minori argument. Indeed, if bodily generation can be completed in a moment, how much more is this the case with spiritual generation, which is more perfect, and less entangled with matter which has time as a property?58
Aristotle argues, indeed, that when something changes, it instantaneously changes into something else and that the time in which such a transformation takes place is an atomic and indivisible moment. "It is clear that that which passes out of existence or comes into existence must do so at an indivisible moment" (Physics, 6.5, 236 a 6-7): A when it becomes B either is A or B; if it is A, then it has not changed; if it is B, then it has already changed. Therefore "the thing that has been changed must already exist as the thing into which it has been changed" (235 b 27-28). That conception is connected with another claim according to which the beginning of a motion is not a motion but an instantaneous event, as John Philoponus had already pointed out. But it also echoes an important argument in Aristotle's analysis of sensation, namely that there are motions without genesis and that sensations "involve no process of becoming, but exist without any such process" (De sensu, 6, 446b 4). Here Montecatini uses the same arguments as Castellani, but whereas the former considers immediate apprehension, especially in the case of knowledge, as incomplete, the sequebatur continuatio, divisioque temporis, continuationem, ac divisionem rei, quae moveretur: sic quoque in intelligentia, quae est motus spiritalis, ut in resolutionibus dicebam, conveniens est, ex rei, quae intelligitur divisione, continuationeque pendere continuationem, & divisionem temporis": Montecatini, De mente humana, 344. 58
Montecatini, De mente humana, 349: "Novissime, & est ratio, quae ex hoc textu sumitur, forma qua huiusmodi est, & non qua continua, est simpliciter individua; simpliciter etiam individua est mens, quae illam comprehendit: ergo (quemadmodum ex Physicis V & VI similitudine perfecta motionis corporeae, quae momento sit, idest ortus & interitus in resolutione declaravimus) necesse est, ut in tempore etiam simpliciter individuo, quod est momentum temporis, forma comprehendatur a mente, atque intelligatur. Confirmari potest haec ratio per locum a minori. Nam si absolui momento potest generatio corporea; quanto magis poterit spiritalis, quae est perfectior quam illa, minusque implicata cum materia, cuius materiae proprium est tempus?" latter holds that instantaneousness is a true aspect of human experience and that it qualifies sensation and intellection in the same way. The Aristotelian conception of sensation helps support the view that intellection is not a temporal event, at least in Castellani's sense, and that it is different from the atemporality of eveternity as well as the coming-to-be of natural substances.
Francesco Piccolomini's Temporal Dualism
Although he is best known for his The military example is visibly borrowed from Castellani. The idea that perceptive and intellectual acts share the same pattern reminds the reader of both Castellani's and Montecatini's positions. But Piccolomini understands it in quite different manner: while Castellani says that one has a primitive image of a thing but not the time to see it -that is, to judge -Piccolomini argues that one does not have time to apply the faculty of vision and hence one does not even have a first perception of the projectile. The consequence is that, according to Piccolomini, one needs time to get a first perception before judging, whereas in the case of Castellani one has first a confused perception and then one needs time to make a judgment about what is perceived. Thus, we can say that intellection occurs in continuous time insofar as it depends on a faculty that has to be applied to an object. But if considered in its own right, the act of intelligence, which Piccolomini also calls a "judgment," "occurs in a moment":
Since the faculty is indivisible, as it is said in the twelfth book of The phrase 'in termino temporis' is equivalent to 'in momento temporis' or 'in nunc temporis' and means nothing other than an instant. It comes from the idea that neither the end nor the beginning of a time, as we saw earlier, is properly a time in Aristotelian physics. For Piccolomini, instantaneousness does not qualify any 'motion of the object' that would be prior to intellectual acts. While the application of the intellectual faculty takes time, judgment or 'apprehension' instantaneously occurs once the faculty has been properly applied to the object, at least in the case of 'objects conjoined with time.' There is indeed an ambiguity here: does it mean that intellections bearing on non-temporal objects, like essences, do not need any previous application of the mind and that we reach them with no delay? Another problem concerns the notion of application. Piccolomini insists twice that the application of a faculty must occur in an actually undivided time. But he holds a different position in his De Anima commentary, saying that such an application cannot be "all at once": it necessarily comes "through a succession because of its link with phantasia."65 The situation described by Piccolomini is probably different in each work: in the commentary he is dealing with the human mind insofar as it is confronted with "hidden things (latentiora)" and is compelled to investigate; in the Naturae totius universi scientia, the object is, so to speak, a given and the application of the intellectual faculty is not hindered by any obstacle. But nevertheless it requires some time while apprehension, which amounts to the actualization of that same faculty, is immediately accomplished. A third stage of the intellective process must be taken into account and may help to clarify Piccolomini's purpose:
I add a third point. While we are in the process of knowing a certain essence and are versed in the inspection and contemplation of it, it is said to happen in an actually indivisible act, that is undivided, and the Philosopher uses that way of speaking, 'actually indivisible' , because, even if we have been engaged in the contemplation of a simple essence for one hour, yet such a contemplation is all at once at every moment, because it is a perfect act and not imperfect as motion, just as the sun goes on illuminating the air for hours and does it in indivisible time because its illumination is entire and perfect at every single moment.66
Considered as a whole, intellection is made 'in undivided time' since it contains a complex structure including application and conservation. But it also occurs 'in true indivisible time' as long as apprehension is done all at once at every moment within the very time of knowledge. Contrary to Montecatini, who classically distinguishes between the intellection of the pure indivisibles (in an instant) and of the actually undivided (in continuous time), Piccolomini claims that there is something instantaneous at the core of every intellection, namely 'judgment' . The divisibility of the intellectual act does not depend on the nature of its content, but rather on the way the psychological process of intellection is carried out.
Conclusion
"Alexandrianism" is a concept coined by Ernest Renan, used to define "the close relation between the denial of the immortality of the soul and the 'naturalistic' approach to nature in the tradition of Aristotle's De Generatione et corruption."72 An interesting aspect of the debate over intellectual time is indeed the attempt to think of intellection as a temporal reality, produced by the mind. In that particular framework, sense-perception and intellection are not opposed because they are understood as referring to separate realities or experiences, but seen as natural events capable of being compared and described with the same theoretical tools. From Porzio to Piccolomini, the Aristotelian concept of 'act' or energeia appears as a key notion, implying a renewed description of the psychology of faculties and their mutual relationships. In such a context, time is no longer conceived only as a feature of motion (in terms of Aristotle's Physics alone), but also as an aspect of acts, either mental, corporeal, or involving both mind and body, such as sensation, intellection or judgment. Because these acts occupy a very short lapse of time or are said to be instantaneous, they are sometimes considered to be different components of one activity developing in a temporal sequence rather than independent operations. Although they disagree over the meaning of Aristotelian concepts, Castellani, Montecatini and Piccolomini give detailed descriptions of the different stages leading to the act of intellection. If we take a broader view, we can also stress the importance of the notion of 'instantaneousness' in the Aristotelian psychology of cognition. It is most obvious in renaissance philosophers like Genua or Montecatini who reject the idea that mental acts, although not eviternal, may have a natural duration. Sensation and intellection are both instantaneous and preserved from the temporality of becoming. But this tight relationship between instantaneousness and mental activity can be found elsewhere. It is frequently used to account for the operations performed by the human mind. For instance, philosophers claiming that the intellect can know many things at once sometimes argue that one intellectual act, like a judgment, can entail several operations of the mind and that those operations are achieved 'in an instant' .73 A similar use of instantaneousness is to be found in the Renaissance and early modern discussion over the status of enthymematic reasoning. 74 In this case, the discussion bears on the question whether the conclusion and the minor premise of a syllogism can be known together in the same instant, as Aristotle seems to suggest in Posterior Analytics 1.1 (71a 17-24).
Despite all this, we should not overestimate the impact of these conceptions on the early modern philosophy of time. If we look at Aristotelian discussions on this topic at the beginning of the seventeenth century, it clearly appears that the theological model of angelic thought is still prevalent in most theological and philosophical works at this time. The Coimbra commentary on De Anima argues that the structure of the human intellect is 'circular' and atemporal and must be contrasted with the 'linear' structure of sense. 75 And when Descartes claims in 1648 that intellectual time knows some sort of 'succession' and is no different from the physical time of corporeal substances, Antoine Arnauld reproaches him for sustaining a very uncommon position, which contradicts most philosophers and theologians. 76 In this respect, it is important to emphasize that the rise of Alexandrianism in the course of the sixteenth century is linked to a specific cultural context. Since mortalists no longer consider the body as an instrument of the soul, potentially detachable from it, but, in line with Galen's psychology, as the necessary basis of everything mental and intellectual, Aristotelian scholars were invited to emancipate their philosophical and psychological reflection from the authority of theology. Mortalism encouraged the development of a 'purified' Aristotelian model whose defenders were led to read Aristotle and theorize without the usual limitations and requirements imposed by faith. Even to some opponents of Pomponazzi, this appeared to be a sound way of doing philosophy. Francesco Piccolomini is a good example of this trend: while he is an open defender of the immortality of the soul, he develops his reflection on intellectual time within the framework originated by Alexandrist scholars like Porzio or Castellani.77 It is quite understandable that the topic of time would receive special attention within that context. Given that the conceptual justification of eternity or immortality, linked to the eschatological aspects of Christianity, has always been a major concern for theologians, describing the relationship of human thought to time apart from the model of separated substances was undeniably a new and challenging enterprise.
